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SECTION 357(c): SOME OBSERVATIONS ON TAX
EFFECTS TO THE CASH BASIS TRANSFEROR
Louis A. DEL COTTO*
INTRODUCTION
W hen an individual or a partnership transfers to a newly formed
corporation all of the assets of an ongoing business, receiving
in exchange the stock of the corporation together with an assumption
of the business liabilities, the tax consequences to the transferor are
governed by sections 351, 357, and 358 of the Internal Revenue Code.
The transferor hopes for complete nonrecognition of gain by reason
of sections 351(a) and 357(a). 1 In recent years, this hope has been frus-
trated by a series of cases decided by the United States Tax Court,2
in which section 357(c)(1)(A) has been applied in a manner apparently
unintended by Congress, so as to undermine the purpose of section 851.
There are two major issues presented by these cases. The first is
whether the word "liabilities" in section 857(c) is to be read literally to
incude accounts payable of a cash basis transferor, or should be read to
include only those liabilities which have given rise to deductions by the
transferor or have arisen from a tax-free borrowing by the transferor on
the value of the transferred assets. This issue is present in Peter Raich,3
John P. Bongiovanni4 and Wilford E. Thatcher.5 The second issue is
* Professor of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo; LL.B., State Uni-
versity of New York at Buffalo, 1951; LL.M., Columbia University, 1961.
1. Section 357(a) was originally enacted in 1939 as section 112(k) in response
to the holding of United States v. Hendler, 303 U.S. 564 (1937), that assumption and
payment of a transferor's liabilities by a transferee corporation in a corporate reorgan-
ization constituted "money or other property." For a discussion of the historical de
velopment of section 357, see Burke & Chisolm, Section 357: A Hidden Trap in Tax-
Free Incorporations, 25 TAx L. REV. 211, 212-15 (1970); Surrey, Assumption of In-
debtedness in Tax-Free Exchanges, 50 YALE L.J. 1 (1940); Comment, Section
357(c) and the Cash Basis Taxpayer, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 1154 (1967).
2. Wilford E. Thatcher, 61 T.C. 28 (1973); John P. Bongiovanni, 30 CCH Tax
Ct. Mer. 1124 (1971), rev'd, 470 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1972); Peter Raich, 46 T.C. 604
(1966) (taxpayer's appeal dismissed on stipulation, Feb. 1, 1968 (9th Cir.)); cf.
David Rosen, 62 T.C. 11 (1974); Velma W. Alderman, 55 T.C. 662 (1971); Arthur
L. Kniffen, 39 T.C. 533 (1962).
3. 46 T.C. 604 (1966).
4. 30 CCH Tax Ct. Mew. 1124 (1971), rev'd, 470 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1972).
5. 61 T.C. 28 (1973).
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whether liabilities, whatever their meaning, are "assumed" or "taken
subject to" by the transferee with the meaning of section 357(c) when
the transferor remains personally liable for them and the transferee is
insolvent, having insufficient assets to discharge the liabilities. This
issue is present in David Rosen6 and Velma W. Alderman.7
THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION 357(c)--THE MEANING
OF "LIABILITIES"
In order to understand the meaning and purpose of section 357(c),
one must study the historical development and interrelationship of
sections 351, 357, and 358. Much has been written on the history of
these sections,8 and it need be sketched only briefly here. The provi-
sions of section 351 were originally enacted in 1921 to facilitate "neces-
sary business readjustments." 9 These provisions were reenacted with-
out major modification in the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 and
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.10 Under these provisions, a trans-
feror of property to a corporation recognized no gain except to the
extent he received in the exchange "other property or money." In
1938, the Supreme Court in United States v. Hendler"1 held that
assumption and payment of a transferor's bonded indebtedness pur-
suant to a merger was the same as receipt of cash from the transferee
and payment by the transferor to its bondholders. Congress quickly
responded12 by passing section 112(k) of the Internal Revenue Code of
1939, which became sections 357(a) and (b) of the 1954 Code without
significant change. Under section 357(a), if the transferee corpora-
tion "assumes a liability of the taxpayer, or acquires property from
the taxpayer subject to a liability, then such assumption or acquisi-
tion shall not be treated as money or other property .... ." The only
exception to this rule prior to 1954 was the provisions of section
6. 62 T.O. 11 (1974).
7. 55 T.C. 662 (1971).
8. See materials cited note 1 supra.
9. See S. REP. No. 275, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1921), reprinted in 1939-1
CUm. BULL. 188.
10. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 112(b) (5), (c) (1) (now INT. REv. CODE OY 1954,
§ 351(a),(b)).
11. 303 U.S. 564 (1937).
12. In H.R. REP. No. 855, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1939) reprinted in 1939-2
Cum. BULL. 518-19, it was stated that Hendler would "largely nullify the provisions of
existing law which postpone the recognition of gain" in corporate reorganizations.
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112(k)13 which treated the liability as money received -if tax avoid-
ance was present or business purpose was lacking. This exception was
reenacted as section 357(b) of the 1954 Code with only one change:
all liabilities assumed or acquired would be "boot" if any one of
them was within section 357(b).' 4
The reason behind this part of section 112(k) (now section 357(b))
is not stated in the report by the Ways and Means Committee,1 but it
appears to have been directed at a conscious effort to borrow out the
value of property and transfer the property to a corporation subject
to the liability, while retaining the borrowed funds. Before the enact-
ment of section 357(b) the transferor would have received the equiva-
lent of boot without recognition of gain because of the Hendler (now
section 357(a)) nonrecognition provision of section 112(k).
The provisions of section 357(c) require recognition of gain for
the excess of liabilities "assumed" or taken "subject to" over the basis
in assets transferred, without regard to the subjective intent of the
transferor. This section was newly enacted in 1954 and was not even
a gleam in the Congressional eye in 1939 when section 112(k) was
passed. The report by the Ways and Means Committee does not discuss
the difficulty arising under section 112(k) which gave rise to the need
for section 357(c), except to give an example of the operation of the
section:
Thus, if an individual transfers, under section 351, property having
a basis in his hands of $20,000, but subject to a mortgage of $50,000,
to a corporation controlled by him, such individual will be subject to
tax with respect to $30,000, the excess of the amount of liability
over the adjusted basis of the property in the hands of the trans-
feror.1
The regulations promulgated under section 357(c) illustrate its
operation with essentially identical examples,' 7 but throw no further
light on the problem that this provision was intended to remedy. One
view is that the purpose of section 357(c) is merely to prevent a
transferor of property subject to a liability from having a negative
13. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 112(k).
14. For a full discussion of this point, and of section 357(b) generally, see Burke
& Chisolm, supra note 1.
15. See H.R. REP. No. 855, supra note 12.
16. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 270 (1954), reprinted in 3 U.S.C.
CONG. & ADM. NEws 4908 (1954).
17. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.357-2(a), .358-3, Ex. 2, T.D. 6528, 26 Fed. Reg. 399 (1961).
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basis in his stock.18 Thus, in the above example, in the absence of
section 357(c) (and assuming section 357(b) does not apply), the
transferor would recognize no gain and his basis in the corporate
stock would be minus $30,000. On essentially these facts, however, the
Tax Court in Jack L. Easson 0 held that the $30,000 was taxable as
gain recognized on the transfer to the corporation. Although decided
in 1960, the facts in Easson occurred in 1952 and, therefore, were not
governed by section 357(c). The Tax Court brushed this problem aside
by stating that section 357(c) was intended only to clarify existing
law.20 The existing law, according to the Tax Court, was that the gain
had to be recognized on the transfer to the corporation or it would
be lost forever, since the transferor's stock basis could not be reduced
below zero to minus $30,000.21 Thus, assuming the value of the trans-
ferred property to be $60,000, on a sale of the zero basis stock for its
equity value of $10,000, the gain would be only $10,000 instead of
the $40,000 gain recognizable if the property itself had been sold by
the transferor. This result, characterized by the Tax Court as "ab-
surd,"22 required recognition of the $30,000 of gain.
The reasoning of the Tax Court on this point is accurate if its un-
derlying assumption is correct. But why cannot property have a nega-
tive basis? The Tax Court's answer was that "[i]f a negative base were
allowed then recognition of gain could be deferred until a subsequent
18. See Cooper, Negative Basis, 75 HARv L. Rv. 1352, 1359 (1962); Comment,
supra note 1, at 1161.
19. 33 T.C. 963 (1960), rev'd, 294 F.2d 653 (9th Cir. 1961).
20. Id. at 971.
21. See id. at 970. The basis adjustments were made by section 113(a) (6) of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1939, which was reenacted without significant change of
substance by sections 358(a) and (d) of the 1954 Code. The basis of the stock would
be the same as in the property ($20,000), increased by the amount of gain recognized
on the transfer (zero), and decreased by any money received by the transferor ($50,000).
Under these provisions, the amount of the mortgage is money for purposes of computing
basis in the corporate stock, so that the stock will reflect the gain potential of the
transferred property. Because the mortgage was either included in the transferor's basis
in the property, or was the product of a borrowing against the value of the property,
on any taxable transfer by the transferor of the property subject to the mortgage, the
mortgage would have been part of his amount realized. However, when the property
is transferred for corporate stock under section 351, the stock will not be encumbered
by the mortgage, and so the mortgage will not be part of the amount realized on a
sale or exchange of the stock. Therefore, the mortgage must be removed from the
basis in the stock. Thus, if the stock is sold for its equity value of, for example, $10,000,
the minus $30,000 basis would produce a gain of $40,000. Without a basis adjustment
for the amount of the mortgage, the sale would produce a $10,000 loss for an overall
windfall to the transferor of $50,000 ($40,000 of untaxed gain plus the $10,000 loss).
22. Id. at 970.
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loss sale or even an abandonment, and unless the taxpayer had other
resources the tax would never be collected."23
The Tax Court says deferral is the problem but suggests the pos-
sibility of complete avoidance due to possible inability to collect the
tax in the future. This reasoning was rejected by the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit.2 In reversing the Tax Court, the court of ap-
peals noted that the "absurd results" feared by the Tax Court could
also be avoided simply by giving the stock a basis of minus $30,000
so that all of the gain inherent in the property would remain in the
stock, to be taxed on its sale. 25 The Ninth Circuit was unwilling to
reject the concept of a negative basis, noting Judge Magruder's argu-
ment for it in Parker v. Delaney.26 Also, that court found the "defer-
ral-avoidance" argument of the Tax Court unacceptable because that
result is implicit in any nonrecognition of gain provision.27 ,
In holding for the taxpayer, the Ninth Circuit noted that the
provisions of section 357(c) did not apply to years prior to 1954.28
This leaves the critical question: why section 357(c)? If its only pur-
pose is a cosmetic one, that is, if gain is taxed only to eliminate a
negative basis in a transferor's corporate stock merely for that
purpose, section 357(c) could be viewed as an arbitrary return to
the Hendler result that Congress once rejected. Because allowance
of a negative basis keeps the taxpayer's potential gain inherent in his
stock under the provisions of section 358, there is no more reason to
tax that part of the gain potential represented by a negative basis
than there is to tax the balance of any gain inherent in the property
transferred. Hendler treatment would seem to be improper for both
of these elements of gain. This, of course, is the thrust of the Ninth
Circuit's argument that the deferral result is implicit in any non-
recognition of gain provision; and such deferral is allowed in spite
of the risk that the nonrecognized gain might never be taxed due to
lack of taxpayer resources.
As already mentioned, Congress did not express the purpose of
section 357(c), save by way of example. Assuming there was intent
23. Id. at n.8.
24. Easson v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 653 (9th Cir. 1961).
25. Id. at 655-56.
26. Id. at 658, citing Parker v. Delaney, 186 F.2d 455 (1st Cir. 1950) (Magruder,
J., dissenting), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 926 (1951).
27. 294 F.2d at 657-58.
28. Id. at 657.
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to prevent a negative basis, as commentators have argued,29 it is sug-
gested that elimination of a negative basis is merely a by-product of
a more fundamental purpose of section 357(c). That purpose is to
tax to the transferor of property the portion of the gain inherent in
the property which represents tax-free dollars already received by the
transferor prior to the transfer. This portion of the gain does not re-
main in the stock, nor does it pass into corporate solution as equity
value in the property. It has been received by the transferor in cash,
and there is no longer a reason for deferral of the tax. In light of
this purpose, the word "liabilities" in section 357(c) should be con-
strued to include only those liabilities which have given rise to a
"tax-benefit" to the transferor, either by way of a deduction or as a
result of a borrowing.
THE RELATIONSHIP OF Crane AND Woodsam Associates TO
SECTION 357(c)
The purpose of section 357(c) becomes apparent in light of cer-
tain case law developments between the enactment of section 112(k)
in 1939 and section 357(c) in 1954. Under the now familiar princi-
ples of Crane v. Commissioner,"0 Parker v. Delaney,31 and Woodsam
Associates v. Commissioner,32 it was possible 'to take depreciation de-
ductions on a "cost" basis composed solely of mortgage debt, without
any cash or property investment; it was also possible to borrow cash
against the value of property without recognizing gain on the borrow-
ing, in spite of absence of personal liability on the debt. Thus, one
could purchase property worth 50 by assuming or taking subject to
a mortgage of 50 and recover tax-free dollars through depreciation
deductions on a "cost" basis of 50 by receiving "advance credit" for
payments to be made in the amount of the mortgage.33 Or, assume
cash of 50 was paid for the property, and after taking depreciation
deductions of 30, the owner borrows 50 against the value of the
property without personal liability. The effect is the same as in the
first example. All the cash investment in the property has been recov-
29. See Cooper, supra note 18, at 1358-60; Comment, supra note 1, at 1161-62.
30. 331 U.S. 1 (1947).
31. 186 F.2d 455 (ist Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 926 (1951).
32. 198 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1952).
33. See Manuel D. Mayerson, 47 T.C. 340 (1966).
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ered through the borrowing, and the prior depreciation deductions
are no longer supported by any investment of funds or property.
Neither situation would produce taxable gain under Crane, Parker
v. Delaney, and Woodsam Associates, despite the fact that there has
been a receipt of tax-free dollars not involving any return of invested
capital. However, when the owner disposed of the property, the trans-
feree assuming or taking subject to the mortgage debt, Crane and
Parker v. Delaney required that the mortgage debt be included as
part of the amount realized in the disposition, whether the disposi-
tion was by sale (Crane) or abandonment (Parker v. Delaney), or even
if transmitted by gift or death.8 4 Once the mortgage debt follows the
property into the hands of the transferee, the transferor can no longer
be given advance credit for eventual payment and, therefore, deferral
must end for gain resulting from depreciation deductions due to the
mortgage and past borrowings on the value of the property.
This is exactly the result under section 357(c). The portion of
the amount realized represented by the mortgage debt is recognized
to the extent it exceeds basis, and the transferor is taxed on that por-
tion of his gain representing past depreciation deductions on the
amount of the liability or, in situations such as Easson and Woodsam
Associates, on gain from dollars borrowed on the value of the prop-
erty without tax. In both situations, the mortgage debt becomes the
corporation's debt, and there is no reason for continued deferral of
the gain already realized in cash by the transferor. So viewed, section
357(c) ends deferral for that part of the transferor's gain which has
already been taken in cash and allows continued deferral for any
balance of the realized gain which passes into corporate solution.
Thus, taking the previous example, if the property at the time of the
transfer has a value of 60, 40 of gain is realized, 30 of it is recognized
and 10 (the value of the equity in the property transferred) remains
to be taxed in the transferor's stock, because the stock's section 358
basis to him is zero.
The continued deferral of the 10 leads, of course, to the possi-
bility of complete avoidance of the tax on that amount. If the tax-
payer holds the stock until death, the "step-up" in basis allowed by
34. See Johnson v. Commissioner, 495 F.2d 1079 (6th Cir. 1974); Rev. Rul.
70-626, 1970-2 Cum. BULL. 158; Del Cotto, Basis and Amount Realized Under Crane,
118 U. PA. L. Rnv. 69, 90-95 (1969).
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section 1014(a) of the Internal Revenue Code will elminate any tax
on that gain by giving a basis of 10 to the stock. This "deferral-
avoidance" is, however, exactly what is intended under the Code when
the effects of a nonrecognition provision are combined with those of
section 1014(a). The net result is to defer taxation of gain which
does not reach the transferor as cash, but remains in the value of his
corporate stock, and to forgive taxation when that value passes at
death. Section 357(c), on the other hand, prevents such deferral-
avoidance possibilities whenever the gain has already been received
by the transferor and will not pass to any subsequent transferees of
his stock, by death or otherwise, while at the same time the liability
has been shifted to the transferee.
Section 357(c) can be seen then as a tax-benefit provision which
withdraws the benefits of the Crane-Woodsam rule when the prop-
erty is transferred subject to the mortgage. Since the transferor will
no longer amortize the mortgage, he must repay past depreciations
of borrowings attributable to the mortgage by recognizing his gain
under section 357(c). This can also be seen as an application of the
debt-cancellation theory of United States v. Kirby Lumber Co.85 The
transfer of property to a corporation, which assumes the mortgage or
takes the property subject thereto, is in effect a release of the trans-
feror from the debt, leaving free of debt the cash received from past
depreciation deductions or borrowing.3 6
Consequently, section 357(c) acts as a "recapture" provision for
gain already received in cash, free from tax. This is probably also its
intended purpose in light of the mortgaged-property example used in
the report by the Ways and Means Committee and in light of such pre-
1954 cases as Woodsam Associates and Easson.. In these cases section 351
transfers gave deferral-avoidance effect not only for the value of the
stock received by the transferor (in our example, 10, the excess of the
property's value of 60 over the mortgage of 50), but also for the gain
due to past tax-free cash received when the transferor borrowed against
the value of the property. Section 357(c) simply plugs an unintended
gap in section 357(b) because, under Crane, Woodsam Associates and
Easson, the deferral-avoidance potential of cash received prior to the
transfer does not depend on tax-avoidance purpose or lack of business
35. 284U.S. 1 (1931).
36. Arthur L. Kniffen, 39 T.C. 553 (1962); cf. Peter W. De Felice, 25 CCIl
Tax Ct. Mem. 835 (1966), aff'd, 386 F.2d 704 (10th Cir. 1967).
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purpose. Section 357(c) does not, however, reinstate the rule of
Hendler for liabilities which do.not involve past tax-benefit to the
transferor.
INTERPRETATION OF "LIABILITIES" IN SECTION 357(C) BY THE
COURTS AND THE TREASURY
The latest case which clearly raises the "liabilities" issue of sec-
tion 357(c) is Wilford E. Thatcher.37 The Thatcher facts also illus-
trate the problem raised and decided in Peter Raich35 and John P.
Bongiovanni.39 Using a simplified version of the facts, a partnership
transferred its construction business assets to a corporation under
section 351. Among the assets transferred was $300,000 of accounts
receivable; the corporation assumed $150,000 of the partnership's ac-
counts payable. The corporation eventually collected all the receiv-
ables, including them in corporate gross income,40 and paid the ac-
37. 61 T.C. 28 (1973).
38. 46 T.C. 604 (1966).
39. 30 COH Tax Ct. Mem. 1124 (1971), rev'd, 470 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1972).
40. Raich and Thatcher seem to hold implicity that no gain is recognized to the
transferor when the transferee collects the accounts receivables. In this area, apparently
the Commissioner is not arguing assignment of income principles, but rather is relying
solely on section 357(c). See Hempt Bros. v. United States, 490 F.2d 1172 (3d Cir.
1974). The reason for this may be that the difference between liabilities and basis can
be greater than the difference between the receivables and payables in some cases.
Indeed, in Bongiovanni the Commissioner expressly refused to allow the transferor to
elect the accrual basis of accounting, although there the transferor was somewhat
selective in accruing all the payables, but only part of the income items. 470 F.2d at
922-23. However, this greater difference did not appear to be present in Raich, Bongio-
vanni, or Thatcher. Thus, the Commissioner may simply be avoiding the conflicting
decisions in the assignment of income area. When accrued earnings from personal
services have been transferred under section 351, the courts have held the transferor
taxable on assignment of income principles. Brown v. Commissioner, 115 F.2d 337 (2d
Cir. 1940); Clinton Davidson, 43 B.T.A. 576 (1941); cf. Rooney v. United States,
305 F.2d 681 (9th Cir. 1962); National See. Corp. v. Commissioner, 137 F.2d 600
(3d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 794 (1943); Adolph Weinberg, 44 T.C. 233
(1965), aff'd sub nom. Commissioner v. Sugar Daddy, Inc., 386 F.2d 836 (9th Cir.
1967) (per curiam), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 929 (1968). But see Arthur L. Kniffen, 39
T.C. 553, 565-66 (1962). However, where the accrued item does not represent earnings
attributable to the transferor's personal services, it has been held that the provisions
of section 351 override principles of assignment of income and clear reflection of income
(INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 446(b), 482). See, e.g., Arthur L. Kniffen, 39 T.C. 553,
564-65 (1962); Thomas W. Briggs, 15 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 440 (1956). See generally
B. BITTKER & J. EUSTIcE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHARE-
HOLDERS 3.17, at 3-59, -60 (3d ed. 1971); Biblin, Assignment of Income in Connec-
tion with Incorporating and Liquidating Corporations, U. So. CAL. 1969 TAX IN ST. 383;
Dunn, Income Tax Considerations in the Transition to a Professional Corporation, 6
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counts payable, deducting them as business expenses in arriving at
taxable income. 41 The partnership had never taken these receivables
and payables into account for income tax purposes, having utilized
the cash receipts and disbursements method of accounting. Disregard-
ing other assets and liabilities, the dispute centered around the
proper tax treatment of the receivables and payables under section
357(c). The court held, as it did in Raich and Bongiovanni, that
since the basis in the receivables was zero, section 357(c) required
AKRON L. REV. 23, 28-29 (1973); Panel Discussion-Income: Whose, When, and
What Kind, N.Y.U. 24TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 1319, 1347-51 (1966); Comment, Tax
Treatment of Unrealized Receivables, 24 BAYLOR L. REV. 345 (1972); Comment, Sec-
tion 357(c), 52 NEBRASKA L. REv. 527, 549-50 (1973). For cases in which the cor-
poration liquidates and the shareholder receives accrued items of income as part of the
liquidating distribution, see B. BiTTxER & J. EUSTicE, supra at 1 11.62.
Section 357(c), of course, presents a discrete problem which is totally unrelated
to questions of assignment of earned income. Resolution of the problem should in no
way depend on whether or not the government pursues the transferor on assignment
of income principles.
41. The deductibility to the corporation of the payables was not in issue in any
of these cases. Arguably, because the corporation acquires the assets in a tax-free ex-
change, at a carryover basis, the transferee corporation should inherit the right to
deduct the accounts payable of the cash basis transferor. Otherwise the deduction may
be lost to both transferor and trainsferee. The courts have rejected this argument,
however, and have denied the deduction to the transferee on the ground that the
payahles are part of the cost of the acquisition of the assets and therefore not deductible,
even though the transferee acquired no basis step-up for the payables. Holdcroft Transp.
Co. v. Commissioner, 153 F.2d 323 (8th Cir. 1946); Rodney, Inc. v. Commissioner, 145
F.2d 692 (2d Cir. 1944); Merchants Bank Bldg. Co. v. Helvering, 84 F.2d 478 (8th
Cir. 1936); Stone Motor Co., 15 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 944 (1956); Automatic
Sprinkler Co. of America, 27 B.T.A. 160 (1932); see B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE,
supra note 40, at 3.12; Landis, Liabilities and Purchase Price, 27 TAX LAw. 67 (1973);
Comment, Section 357(c), 52 NEBRASKA L. REV. 527, 547-48 (1973); cf. INT. REv. CODE
OF 1954, § 381(c)(4); Treas. Reg. § 1.381(c)(4)-1(b)(1), Ex. 2 (1964) (allowing
the transferee to step into the shoes of the transferor with respect to certain deductible
liabilities assumed in certain reorganizations). See also INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §
381(c) (16).
Apparently the Commissioner is not pursuing the above line of cases and is willing
to allow the deduction to the corporate transferee. Indeed, in Bongiovanni, the Com-
missioner refused to allow the transferor to change his accounting method from cash
to accrual in order to deduct the payables and avoid the result of Raich. 30 CCH Tax
Ct. Mem. at 1126. Instead of also including the receivables to the transferor under the
accrual method, and thus preventing the application of section 357(c) (see Rev. Rul.
69-442, 1969-2 Cum. BULL. 53), apparently the Commissioner prefers section 357(c)
effect to the transferor, and will allow the corporate transferee to deduct the payables.
See Panel Discussion, supra note 40, at 1347-51; Points to Remember, 18 A.B.A. BULL.
SECT. TAx. No. 3, at 114 (1965). Note also the dictum in Bongiovanni that the cor-
porate transferee would be entitled to a deduction for the payables. 470 F.2d at 925.
Deduction of the payables by the corporation is not a justification for inclusion
thereof to the transferor under section 357(c). Indeed, there should be allowed both
an exclusion to the transferor and a deduction to the transferee so that the deduction
is not lost to both parties. See Treas. Reg. § 1.381 (c) (4)-1 (b)(1) Ex. 2 (1964).
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the $150,000 excess of payables over that zero basis to be recognized
as gain.
In Revenue Ruling 69-442,42 the Internal Revenue Service dis-
cussed the Raich case and stated that
[t]he Internal Revenue Service will apply section 357(c) of the
Code to other situations involving similar facts inasmuch as such sec-
tion literally applies and the legislative history clearly supports the
application of that section under such circumstances. However, the
Service wishes to point out that the trade accounts receivable would
not have had a zero basis if the taxpayer had been on the accrual
method of accounting prior to the transfer of the business under sec-
tion 351 of the Code.43
The Service's position is two-pronged: that section 357 (c) literally
applies and that the legislative history clearly supports a literal appli-
cation. The Tax Court agrees that section 357(c) is a "mechanical
test,"' 44 which is to be applied literally,45 but has never stated that
such application is "clearly supported" by legislative history. Indeed,
it has only found an "absence of a clearly expressed congressional
intent. . .. ,,46 The Second Circuit in Bongiovanni v. Commissioner4 7
held, however, that the word "liabilities" cannot be read literally
because it is used in the same sense in section 357(c) as in the legis-
lative history of section 357(c) to mean liens, particularly mort-
gages.48 "Any other construction," said the court, "results in an ab-
surdity in the case of a cash basis taxpayer whose trade accounts pay-
able are not recognized as a deduction . . . but whose 'liabilities'
are recognized for purposes of Section 357(c)." 49
In Thatcher, the Tax Court refused to follow the holding of the
Second Circuit in Bongiovanni. The Tax Court said that the example
in the report by the Ways and Means Committee was only one illustra-
tion of the operation of section 357(c), which happened to involve a se-
cured liability and that this illustration did not preclude section 357(c)
42. Rev. Rul. 69-442, 1969-2 Cum. BULL. 53.
43. Id. at 54.
44. Wilford E. Thatcher, 61 T.C. 28, 35 (1973).
45. "[W]e must assume that congress intended for the term 'liabilities' to have
its ordinary meaning." Id. at 37.
46. Peter Raich, 46 T.C. 604, 611 (1966).
47. 470 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1972).
48. Id. at 924.
49. Id. at 924 (emphasis in original).
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from applying to unsecured liabilities." Thus, the court appeared to be-
lieve that the Committee's example constituted insufficient reason to
construe the meaning of the word "liabilities" in any way but its ordi-
nary meaning-all liabilities, both secured and unsecured. But this re-
sponse to Bongiovanni misses its main point: that the liabilities as-
sumed by the corporation, secured or not, had never been the sub-
ject of a deduction by the cash basis transferor. The Tax Court did
not come to grips with the real issue of whether section 357(c) was
intended to be only a "recapture" statute. This is rather surprising
since the court did acknowledge that its literal interpretation "may
conflict with the well established intent of Congress to foster tax-free
business reorganizations" 51 and "may appear to undermine the pur-
pose of section 351."52
In David Rosen,as the Tax Court went even further and noted
that Raich and Thatcher "may even result in the realization of a gain
for tax purposes where none in fact exists. However, the petitioner
did not contend, and the court is loath to find, that the result exceeds
the constitutional powers to tax vested in the Congress."5 4 This state-
ment was made in apparent approval of the results in Raich and
Thatcher. Nevertheless, in footnote three of the Rosen opinion the
Tax Court stated:
In enacting this provision, the Congress intended to deal with
the case where the transferor takes the deduction for depreciation on
account of assets purchased with borrowed funds and the transferee
repays the loan. Its effect is analogous to other recapture provisions
in the Code. S. Rept. No. 1622 . .. 83d Cong., 2d Sess. p. 270
(1954); H. Rept. No. 1337 . . . 83d Cong., 2d Sess., p. A129
(1954) .55
Footnote three of Rosen is consistent with the holding of that
case since there was involved the recapture of past depreciation de-
ductions taken on the basis of loans, and the transferee corporation
received the assets subject to such loans. Thus, section 357(c) was
held to apply to the excess of the loans over asset basis. At the same
50. 61 T.C. at 37. This issue was specifically decided against the taxpayer in
Testor v. Commissioner, 327 F.2d 788 (7th Cir. 1964), aff'g 40 T.C. 273 (1963).
51. Peter Raich, 46 T.C. 604, 611 (1966).
52. Wilford E. Thatcher, 61 T.C. 28, 37 (1973).
53. 62 T.C. 11 (1974).
54. Id. at 19 (footnote omitted).
55. Id. at n.3.
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time, the footnote is contrary to Raich and Thatcher to the extent
that in those cases no recapture was present. This may indicate that
the Tax Court is reconsidering the Raich and Thatcher situations in
light of the "recapture" purpose of section 357(c). Or, it may only
mean that this is the view of Judge Quealy, who wrote the Rosen
opinion, and who took the same position in a vigorous dissent in
Thatcher, in which he supported the holding of the Second Circuit
in Bon giovanni.8
Hopefully, the Tax Court's position will change so that section
357(c) will be applied in its historical context to tax only previously
untaxed gain received by the transferor in cash. In Raich and
Thatcher, the payables had never been deducted by the cash basis
transferors; nor had the receivables been taken into their income. In
Bongiovanni, the transferor attempted to change the method of ac-
counting of his sole proprietorship from cash to accrual in order to
deduct the payables. The Commissioner disallowed the deduction, re-
fusing to consent to the change of accounting method; and his refusal
was upheld by the Tax Court. 57 It was only in Bongiovanni, due to
the reversal of the Tax Court by the Second Circuit, that section 357(c)
was not applied, and section 351 given its proper effect. There the
Second Circuit held that the payables were not liabilities for pur-
poses of section 357(c).
Although the court did not discuss the point, presumably the pay-
ables also were not liabilities for purposes of section 358(d)-the pay-
ables did not represent cash received by the transferror through a
borrowing or a deduction, nor did they enter into the transferor's basis
in the assets transferred, that is, the receivables. 58 Thus, Crane and
Parker v. Delaney would not have required the liabilities to be a part
of the transferor's amount realized had the assets been transferred in
a taxable sale. Therefore, in a section 351 exchange, there is no reason
for reduction of the transferor's stock basis under section 358(d).59 The
56. Wilford E. Thatcher, 61 T.C. 28, 39 (1973) (Quealy, J., dissenting). Since
Rosen was not reviewed by the entire Tax Court, it would appear that it holds little
implication for the issues in Raich and Thatcher.
57. 30 OCH Tax Ct. Mem. at 1126-27.
58. Peter Raich, 46 T.C. 604, 610-11 (1966).
59. See note 21 supra. See also Robinson v. Commissioner, 97 F.2d 552 (9th Cir.
1938); Brons Hotels, Inc., 34 B.T.A. 376, 382-83 (1936) (dissenting opinion); Surrey,
Assumption of Indebtedness in Tax-Free Exchanges, 50 YALE L.J. 1, 9-10 (1940);
Comment, supra note 41, at 547 n.80; Comment, The Availability of Tax-Free Incor-
poration to the Cash Basis Taxpayer, 26 U. FLA. L. REv. 289, 299 n.72 (1964). For
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overall result is that his stock basis is zero (substituted under section
358(a)(1)) and the stock itself has a value of $150,000 (the excess of the
value of the receivables over the payables). This leaves the transferor
in the same position with respect to his stock as he was with respect
to his business assets and liabilities prior to the transfer-his total po-
tential taxable gain is $150,000.
Under this analysis the result for the corporation after the transfer
is also satisfactory. The corporation acquires the receivables at a carry-
over basis of zero under section 362(a)(1) and deducts the payables,
for an overall taxable gain of $150,000.60 Under the holdings of Raich
and Thatcher, however, the gain is distorted at both the shareholder
and corporate level. The transferor's shares of stock will have a zero
basis under sections 358(a)(1) and 358(d)0' and will have a gain
potential of $150,000 on resale, even though he has already recognized
a $150,000 gain under section 357(c). The shareholder will have been
subjected to tax on an overall gain of $300,000, when his potential
for gain prior to the transfer was only $150,000 ($300,000 of re-
ceivables, less $150,000 of deductible payables). The corporation
will take the receivables at a basis of $150,000 (transferor's zero basis
increased in the amount of the transferor's section 357(c) gain under
section 362(a))6 and will deduct the payables of $150,000 so as to
eliminate all taxable gain at the corporate level.
Compare this result with a situation to which section 357(c) was
intended to apply-a transfer of property worth $400,000 and subject
to a mortgage of $300,000 in which the transferor's basis is $150,000.
After the exchange, the transferor's basis is zero in stock which has a
value of $100,000. The transferor's potential gain in the asset was
$250,000: $150,000 is recognized under section 357(c), and $100,000
remains unrecognized in the corporate stock. The corporation's basis in
the asset will be $300,000, an amount equivalent to the mortgage; and
there is a gain potential for the corporation identical to that of the
a contrary view, see Note, Application of Section 357(c) when the Cash Basis Tax-
payer Incorporates, 4 MEMpHIS ST. U.L. Rxv. 41, 46, 51-52 (1973).
60. This is the usual "multiplier effect" of a section 351 transaction, when the
shareholder receives no boot. For example, assume there had been no payables but only
receivables of $300,000. The shareholder carries a potential $300,000 gain by way of a
zero basis in his stock, and the corporation carries the same gain potential by a carry-
over basis in the receivables.
61. The Tax Court so held in Thatcher, 61 T.C. at 38.
62. For an interpretation of Raich giving the corporation a zero basis, see Burke
& Chisolm, supra note 1, at 228-32.
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shareholder-$100,000. The shareholder recognizes only the amount of
gain represented by tax-free cash received due to the mortgage. The
rest of his realized gain receives deferral-avoidance treatment because
it is in corporation solution. The corporation will eventually recog-
nize only that portion of the gain which was not received by the
shareholder in cash-the portion which remains in corporate solution.
Therefore, it seems clear that under Raich and Thatcher the trans-
feror is being taxed on an amount which never was and never will be
received by him as gain. It is no answer that the same amount is given
as stepped-up basis to the corporation, since in fact there is no gain to
to the transferor to begin with. By way of a more graphic illustration,
assume the payables are 300 and the receivables are 300. Raich and
Thatcher tax the transferor on 300 under section 357(c), and his zero
basis stock carries a further gain potential of zero-an aggregate gain
of 300 when the pre-transfer total gain was zero. The corporation will
take the receivables at a basis of 300 and deduct 300 of payables when
paid, for an overall loss of 300 after collecting the receivables. Clearly,
the entire gain to the transferor is manufactured out of whole cloth
by such an application of section 357(c). And again it is no answer that
the corporation, a separate taxable entity, has a loss or even without
the deduction, has no gain. This result merely demonstrates the non-
sense of measuring gain by liabilities which have been of no tax bene-
fit to the transferor.
AVOIDING THE TAx COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 357(c)
ON "LIABILITIEs"
Is there any means by which the cash basis transferor can avoid
the application of section 357(c) under the holdings of Raich and
Thatcher? One method would involve either increasing the basis of
the receivables, reducing the liabilities, or effecting some combination
of both, in order to eliminate any difference between liabilities and
basis. In both Raich and Thatcher the argument was made that the
payables represented the cost of producing the receivables, and, there-
fore, the receivables had a basis equal to the payables, preventing the
application of section 357(c). In both cases the Tax Court refused to
accept this argument and held that the receivables had a zero basis
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to the cash basis taxpayer.63 This argument would, of course, equate
the payables to a mortgage on the receivables, which is part of the
transferor's basis in the receivables. It puts the taxpayer in the novel,
though awkward, position of requesting capitalization of items which
were deductible and which, in both cases, were in fact deducted by
the corporate transferee.64
An alternative solution is for the transferor to withhold the ac-
counts payable and a like amount of receivables from the corporation,
as suggested by the Tax Court in Thatcher.06 This procedure would, of
course, frustrate the very purpose of section 357(a), which was intended
by Congress to facilitate tax-free exchanges by precluding the need for
withholding liabilities.60
Finally, there is the solution presented by Judge Hall's dissent-
ing opinion in Thatcher.67 His view of the proper interpretation to
be given section 357(c) is argued by way of analogy:
If a cash method taxpayer transfers $1000 of trade receivables to an
outside party in exchange for the assumption and payment of $1000
of the taxpayer's trade payables, he has no taxable income. He
realizes $1000 of gross income on the receivables, for they have been
sold for payment of the payables, but he realizes an offsetting de-
duction of $1000 on the payables, for they have been paid for by
the recipient of the receivables. 68
The same taxpayer, making the same exchange with his controlled
corporation, will have $1000 of recognized gain under section 357(c);
but, argues Judge Hall, he will also have an offsetting deduction of
$1000 for "payment" of the payables. 69
The argument is appealing, but its foundation is unclear. Is the
transferor being placed on the accrual method of accounting with re-
spect to the receivables and payables? Apparently not, because Judge
Hall's analysis assumes the receivables are transferred at a zero basis.7 0
Indeed, it is the fact of a zero basis in the receivables which creates the
need for an offsetting deduction of the payables.
63. Wilford E. Thatcher, 61 T.C. 28, 34 (1973); Peter Raich, 46 T.C. 604, 610-11
(1966).
64. Wilford E. Thatcher, 61 T.C. at 36; Peter Raich, 46 T.C. at 610-11.
65. 61 T.C. at 37.
66. See note 12 supra; Comment, supra note 1, at 1165-66.
67. 61 T.C. at 42 (Hall, J., dissenting).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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Is the transferor to be treated as a cash basis taxpayer who trans-
fers the receivables in return for $1000 cash and then pays $1000 cash
in consideration for the corporation assuming the payables? This
seems to be Judge Hall's factual hypothesis. The direct assumption of
the payables merely eliminates the intermediate step of a cash swap
and becomes the price paid by the corporation for the receivables.
But, what is the event which gives the transferor the deduction for
payment of the payables? Does the event occur at the time of the as-
sumption or only when the corporation makes the payment? In James
M. Pierce Corp. v. Commissioner,71 in which property was purchased
for cash and the seller's liabilities for unearned newspaper subscrip-
tions were assumed, the court held that the seller was entitled to a de-
duction for the liabilities without regard to payment thereof by the
buyer.7 2 Since the liabilities reduced the cash received, the seller was
viewed as having paid that amount to the buyer for his assumption of
the seller's liabilities.7 This payment was further regarded as equiva-
lent to a direct payment to seller's creditors in discharge of the liabili-
ties.74
71. 326 F.2d 67 (8th Cir. 1964).
72. Id. at 69.
73. Id. at 70.
74. Id. at 72; cf. Arthur L. Kniffen, 39 T.C. 533, 566-67 (1962). Pierce Corp.
appears to give the taxpayer a windfall. The court allows a "deduction" for the sub-
scription obligations despite the fact that the prepaid cash subscriptions represented by
the liabilities had never been included in the seller's income. See 326 F.2d at 69. In al-
lowing the "deduction" the court analogized the transaction to a sale of assets subject to a
mortgage. Id. at 71-72. This analogy fits exactly the facts of the case since the cash
received by the seller as prepaid subscriptions was effectively the same as cash received
from borrowing on the value of the business assets. In both situations (under the
Pierce Corp. facts) the cash does not enter gross income at the time of receipt. When the
asset is sold subject to the mortgage, however, the amount of the mortgage debt (sub-
scription liabilities) must be included by the seller in his amount realized from the sale,
even though cash is received only in the amount of the equity in the property. In this
manner the seller is finally taxed for the cash benefits attributable to the debt, since
they are no longer encumbered by the debt. Inclusion of the debt in the amount
realized simply ends the deferral of tax on gain previously received in cash.
This was essentially the analysis used by the court in finding that the subscription
reserves were part of the income received on the sale of the business assets. Id. at 69.
The court went on, however, to hold that this income was fully offset by a deduction in
the amount of the subscription liabilities. Id. This makes no sense. It is the same as
giving the mortgagor a deduction for payment of the mortgage. To do so is to give him
an exclusion from income on the initial borrowing, an inclusion of the debt as income
on the sale to end the deferral from the exclusion, and also a deduction to negate the
inclusion. The net result is that the deferral for the initial exclusion becomes a per-
manent forgiveness of tax on the cash borrowed, which will not be repaid. This is the
result in Pierce Corp.; allowance of the "deduction" for the amount of the subscription
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Unlike Pierce Corp., which involved long-term liabilities, the lia-
bilities assumed in Thatcher were paid by the corporation in the year
of the transfer. Therefore, Judge Hall treated payment of the liabili-
ties by the corporation as payment by the transferor, giving the trans-
feror a deduction to offset the section 357(c) inclusion. Thus, it appears
that the corporation was viewed as the agent of the transferor in mak-
ing the payment.7 5
Judge Hall's opinion went on to state:
Our analysis is fully in accord with the purpose of section 357(c).
Under it, there is no need to strain, as does Bongiovanni v. Commis-
sioner . . . , to read the word "liabilities" in a difficult-to-define,
artificial "tax" sense. Section 357(c) is given full, literal effect.70
The majority in Thatcher made the mistake of including nonde-
ducted payables as liabilities under section 357(c). Judge Hall would
correct that mistake by allowing a deduction to wash out the inclusion.
The need for a deduction exists, however, only if the inclusion is
proper to begin with. Since a Crane-Woodsam analysis precludes this
kind of liability from being part of the amount realized under sec-
tion 357(c), the proper result is exclusion of the liabilities, not a com-
bination of inclusion-deduction. Although either analysis seems to pro-
duce the same result, there can be a difference. Judge Hall's hypothesis
makes the deductibility of the payables turn on the assumption that the
payables are the price paid for the receivables. This hypothesis is work-
able and analytically supportable when the exchange is a fully taxable
one, made at arms length. In such case, the receivables will equal or
liabilities to offset that same amount of income from the sale left the seller with the
benefit of the prepaid subscriptions without any tax liability therefor.
Nor is the analysis changed by viewing the seller as receiving the gross amount of
the purchase price in cash and discharging the debt himself. See id. at 72. The cash
received as purchase price, which is used to pay the debt, simply frees from the en-
cumbrance of the mortgage the cash previously borrowed in the same way as if the
buyer took subject to the debt, or assumed it, paying only the net price in cash. To give
to the seller a deduction for paying the debt leaves the borrowed dollars permanently
free of tax.
If, however, the liabilities present in Pierce Corp. had been such as to have given
the seller no tax benefit-such as trade accounts payable of a cash basis taxpayer-
then the "deduction" allowed to wash the debt from the seller's amount realized would
not give the seller a tax windfall. In Thatcher, Judge Hall was applying the Pierce Corp.
analysis to such a liability; therefore, his analysis is not subject to the criticism made
of the Pierce Corp. opinion.
75. 61 T.C. at 42; see Royal Oak Apartments, Inc., 43 T.C. 243 (1964); Andrew
Jergens, 17 T.C. 806 (1951).
76. 61 T.C. at 43.
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exceed the amount of the payables, and any amount realized due to as-
sumption of the payables is fully offset by the deduction for payment.
7
In a section 351 exchange, however, the amount of the payables could
exceed the value of the assets transferred.78 If, for example, the payables
are $1000 and the receivables are only $250, then only $250 of the pay-
ables are paid for the receivables; and in the absence of other assets
to make up the difference, $750 is still taxed to the transferor under
section 357(c). The deduction no longer equals the inclusion because
the deduction depends on the value of the assets transferred. Thus, to
the extent Judge Hall's remedy works at all, it works haphazardly
because it relies on the value of the assets transferred being at least
equal to the amount of the payables. There may be only a few cases
in which payables will exceed the basis of the assets transferred; never-
theless, the possibility of only haphazard relief for the transferor un-
derscores the need for a remedy which does not depend on the value of
assets transferred. Any deduction to the transferor should not depend
on the corporation receiving assets as consideration for assuming the
payables; rather, it should be allowed to the transferor without regard
to such assets, simply as a remedy for improperly treating the payables
as liabilities under section 357(c). This brings us back to the main
point that the proper treatment of the payables is exclusion, rather
than inclusion and deduction.
The deduction solution also has its own difficulties with respect
to identification of the deductible event in the situation in which the
liabilities are discharged by the transferee in a year after that of in-
corporation. Furthermore, if the transferor receives a deduction either
in the year of the initial section 351 transfer, or in the later year of
discharge, what is the tax treatment to the corporation? Judge Hall
noted the problem in Thatcher but found consideration of it unneces-
sary.79 Presumably the corporation would not be allowed a deduction,
but could treat the assumption of liabilities as the cost of the receiv-
ables and other assets acquired, so as to have eventual basis offset when
the receivables are collected by the corporation. Even so, distortions
can arise in the corporate income due to problems regarding alloca-
77. See, e.g., Grane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1, 4 n.6 (1946); Magruder v.
Supplee, 316 U.S. 394 (1941); INT. Rv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1001(b)(2), 164(d)(1).
See generally Landis, supra note 41.
78. See, e.g., David Rosen, 62 T.C. 11 (1974).
79. 61 T.C. at 43.
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tion of basis among the various assets.8 0 These problems are all avoided
by treating the payables as outside section 357(c), and allowing the
corporation a deduction for payment thereof.
RETENTION OF PERSONAL LIABILITY BY THE TRANSFEROR
The second major issue presented by the recent cases is whether
liabilities are "assumed" or taken "subject to" within the meaning of
section 357(c), when the transferor remains personally liable for them
and the corporate transferee is insolvent, having insufficient assets to
pay the liabilities. This question is germane not only to the Raich
and Thatcher situations, where there was no recapture of past tax
benefit, but also to transfers involving recapture-intended to be
within section 357(c) when liabilities exceed basis.
Lack of assumption should make no difference under section
357(c) because that section applies whether the liability is "assumed"
or the property is only taken "subject to" the liability. In light of the
example in the report by the Ways and Means Committee, the reason
for treating both situations in the same manner may have been that
Congress only had in mind liabilities which were a lien upon the assets
transferred-such as property subject to a mortgage. Since the mort-
gagee will normally pursue the property in order to satisfy the lien, the
transferor's personal liability has significance only when the value of
the property falls below the mortgage.
Section 357(c) should also apply in certain cases in which the lia-
bilities are not secured, as for example, a note payable to a bank for a
loan received by the transferor. The issue of the effect of a transferor's
continuing personal liability on such a note was present in Raich, but
was not discussed by the Tax Court.81 In David Rosen s2 all the elements
favorable to a decision for the transferor were present, and section
357(c) was still held to apply. In Rosen, the liabilities were not secured,
the transferor was personally liable for them, and the corporation was
at all times insolvent, so that the creditors continued to look to the
transferor for repayment. Even so, section 357(c) was applied literally
80. See Burke & Chisolm, supra note 1, at 229, 233-34; Rabinowitz, Allocating
Boot in Section 351 Exchanges, 24 TAX L. REv. 337, 360-65 (1969).
81. 46 T.C. at 604-05.
82. 62 T.C. 11 (1974).
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because, according to the Tax Court, "there is no requirement in sec-
tion 357(c)(1) that the transferor be relieved of liability."8' 3
True enough, but this reason does not reach the issue presented.
Though the transferor need not be relieved of liability, the question
remains whether the corporate transferee has "assumed" or taken the
the property "subject to" the liabilities within the meaning of sec-
tion 357(c). If the value of the assets has fallen below the amount of
the liabilities, so that the corporate transferee is insolvent, then, argu-
ably, although the asset has been transferred, the liability, to the ex-
tent of the difference between asset value and liability, has not been
transferred and remains with the transferor who is personally liable.
Certainly, to the extent of that difference, there are no assets "subject
to" the liability. And even if the transferee assumes the liability (a
fact which was unclear in Rosen), the assumption is a hollow one until
such time as the transferee acquires assets sufficient to meet the obli-
gation.
Thus, if the transferred property worth 40 is subject to a mort-
gage of 50 and the transferor's basis is 20, the section 357(c) gain
should be only 20, not 30. This position is supported by the rationale
of Hendlere4-- that it is the transferee's assumption and payment of the
transferor's obligations which is to be treated as money received by
the transferor.8 5 The Second Circuit so held in Bickford's, Inc. v. Hel-
vering,86 in which the court refused to interpret Hendler to allow a
basis step-up to the transferee for liabilities assumed prior to the year
of payment.8 7 In accord is Commissioner v. Corpus Christi Terminal
Co. 88 The Board of Tax Appeals had allowed a transferee's basis in
assets to be increased, under the provisions of what is now section
362(b), by the amount of liabilities assumed. 9 The Fifth Circuit re-
manded, stating it was necessary for the Board to make a finding
whether the liabilities had been paid, and if so, when.90 In Walter F.
Haass,01 however, the Board of Tax Appeals construed Hendler to
require only an assumption of the liability. This construction fol-
83. Id. at 19.
84. 303 U.S. 564 (1938).
85. Id. at 566.
86. 98 F.2d 568 (2d Cir. 1938).
87. Id. at 569.
88. 110 F.2d 651 (5th Cir. 1940).
89. Corpus Christi Terminal Co., 38 B.T.A. 944 (1938).
90. 110 F.2d at 651.
91. 37 B.T.A. 948 (1938).
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lowed the Board's holdings in the pre-Hendler cases of Brons Hotels,
Inc.92 and In re Theodore Ebert,3 which involved exchanges under
sections 112(b)(1) and 112(c)(1) of the 1928 Revenue Act (now sec-
tions 1031(a) and (b)).
In 1939, when Congress enacted section 112(k) of the 1939 Code,
it was stated in the report by the Ways and Means Committee:
The recent Supreme Court case of United States v. Hendler . . .
has been broadly interpreted to require that, if a taxpayer's liabilities
are assumed by another party in what is otherwise a tax-free reor-
ganization, gain is recognized to the extent of the assumption. In
typical transactions changing the form or entity of a business it is not
customary to liquidate the liabilities of the business and such liabili-
ties are almost invariably assumed by the corporation which con-
tinues the business. Your committee therefore believes that such a
broad interpretation as is indicated above will largely nullify the
provisions of existing law which postpone the recognition of gain in
such cases....
[T]he bill amends section 112 . . . by adding a new subsection
(k) which provides . . . gain shall not be recognized to the trans-
feror on account of the assumption of liabilities or the transfer of
property subject to liability.94
Congress apparently saw the Hendler threat to non-recognition ex-
changes as a broad one, because Hendler was being interpreted to
reach *assumptions of liability without regard to payment. Section
112(k), however, was drafted to protect against an application of
Hendler not only to assumptions of liability, but also, if there were no
assumption, to property merely being acquired subject to the liability.
The "subject to" portion of section 112(k) seems to be an excess of
caution. If section 112(k) had been drafted to apply only to assump-
tions of liability, Hendler could hardly be interpreted to reach unas-
sumed liabilities which the property was acquired "subject to." Thus,
the "subject to" portion of section 112(k) merely makes explicit a neces-
sary implication of the "assumption" language of section 112(k). This
shield, however, became a sword when the same language was used in
92. 34 B.T.A. 376 (1936).
93. 37 B.T.A. 186 (1938). Prior to Hendler, assumption of debt was treated as
money in "like-kind exchanges," but not in reorganizations or tax-free incorporation.
See Surrey, supra note 1, at 6-10. Section 1031 exchanges continue to receive such
treatment since there is no section 357(a) exception to the provisions of section 1031 (b).
See Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(d)-2 (1954).
94. H.R. REP. No. 855, supra note 12, at 19.
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a later part of section 112(k) (now section 357(b)), in section 113(a)(6)
(now section 358(d)), and eventually, in 1954, in section 357(c). The
transferor was required to reduce his stock basis by the liabilities as-
sumed or acquired subject to. Also, the Hendler rule was applied in
the broadest possible way when the provisions of section 357(b) or (c)
were invoked-to liabilities assumed or taken subject to.
The irony inherent in section 357(c) did not prevent its literal
application in Rosen. However, an assumed congressional intent to so
apply the Hendler rule still does not reach the situation in which the
amount of the liability "assumed" or taken "subject to" exceeds the
value of the assets available to pay the liability, and in which the
transferor remains personally liable. To the extent of the difference
between liability and asset value, the transferor continues to have
sole liability for the debt; and, to the extent of that difference, there
are no assets "subject to" the liability. In the Rosen situation there is
no apparent application of Hendler however broadly construed.9 5
There is, of course, the possibility that the assets will appreciate
in value, or that the transferee will acquire other funds through earn-
ings, or otherwise, and in fact pay the liabilities. At that point, any gain
not yet taxed to the transferor would be recognized. It has been argued,
however, that such a result would impose on the government "the
onerous burden of keeping an eye on the transferee's later actions."9' 6
The administrative burden is easier if, instead, the transferor is taxed
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at the time of the transfer. If he eventually pays the liability him-
self, he would then take a deductionY7 However, this onerous burden
is only a continuation of the government's present burden in policing
the Crane, Parker v. Delaney, and Woodsam Associates area. The time
when past tax benefits are recaptured is simply postponed beyond the
time of the transfer of the asset.
In any event, whether gain is recognized to the transferor does
not depend upon administrative convenience, but upon whether, at
the time of the transfer, the liability had been assumed or the assets
acquired were subject thereto. This issue should turn on whether the
assets transferred are sufficient to meet the liabilities in question.
When the transferee does not assume the liabilities, then neither the
"assumption" nor the "subject to" language of section 357(c) reaches
the excess of liabilities over assets. Even an assumption by the trans-
feree of the liabilities is more of a formality than a reality with re-
spect to the excess when, as in Rosen, the creditors continue to look
to the transferor's personal liability, though it may have become a
secondary liability under local law. To apply Hendler, which involved
assumption and payment, to a situation in which assumption may be
merely formal, because the assets needed for payment are lacking, is
to stretch the irony of section 357(c) to the breaking point.
Velma W. Alderman9" presents a variation of the Rosen problem.
The transferor transferred to a newly formed corporation, under sec-
tion 351, depreciated trucks and trailers in exchange for the corporate
stock, together with an assumption by the corporation of the trans-
feror's trade accounts payable and notes payable representing bank
loans which were encumbrances on the trucks and trailers. The trans-
feror had been an accrual basis taxpayer, so that all the payables had
given him tax benefit, by way of deduction for the trade payables and
by receipt of cash on the bank loans. The liabilities exceeded the trans-
feror's adjusted basis in the vehicles by $9,000. To compensate for the
difference, the transferor also executed a personal promissory note pay-
able to the corporation in the face amount of $10,000, thereby creating
a capital stock account of $1,000.
The issue before the court was whether the receipt by the corpo-
ration of the note eliminated the $9,000 difference between liabilities
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and adjusted basis and, thereby, prevented the application of section
357(c). The Tax Court held that the taxpayer incurred no cost in mak-
ing the note-its basis to him was zero, and the corporation's carryover
basis was also zero.99 The $9,000 gap was not closed and was determined
to be recognized gain under section 357(c). "To conclude otherwise,"
stated the court, "would effectively eliminate section 357(c) from the
Internal Revenue Code. It would be a relatively simple matter to exe-
cute a note so that adjusted basis would always exceed liabilities."' 100
This "cost" analysis by the Tax Court is oversimplistic because it
fails to consider the implications for the definition of cost, present in
the Crane and Woodsam Associates doctrines. 101 The acquisition of
property or money in exchange for a liability requires no recognition
of gain, but the liability nevertheless becomes the "cost basis" of the
asset acquired. Advance credit for basis is given without recognition
of gain, until such time as the obligor is relieved of the liability prior
to repayment of the loan. In Alderman, although the taxpayer received
no cash for his note, he did encumber his credit with an obligation to
pay the note and, at the same time, did increase the value of the corpo-
rate stock received in the exchange. By giving him advance credit for
payment of the note, both his basis and the corporation's basis therein
would be $10,000. In this way the note is equated with an identical
note given to a third-party lender for cash, and the cash is in turn con-
tributed to the corporation at a 100 percent basis.
What is more, the Tax Court's analysis goes only halfway because
it fails to take into consideration the taxpayer's argument that "since
he has given his note to the corporation for this amount and subse-
qently has paid this note from his personal funds, the corporation has
not borne the burden of paying this excess amount."'02 The response
by the Tax Court was simply to find that the record did not show pay-
ment of the note with taxpayer's personal funds. 03
Lack of payment may have raised some doubt about the bona
fides of the note. Such doubt is also demonstrated by the court's state-
ment that to allow the note a basis "would effectively eliminate sec-
tion 357(c).' 0 4 Assuming the note was intended to be paid, the holding
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of no cost basis does not meet the taxpayer's apparent point: the pres-
ence of the note had the effect of a retention by the transferor of
$10,000 of the liabilities. The $9,000 excess of liabilities over basis was
eliminated, if not by "basis" in the note, then by reduction in the lia-
bilities assumed by the corporation. In essence, the transferor had re-
ceived the corporate stock subject to a $10,000 liability, and the face
amount of the liabilities assumed by the corporation must, therefore,
be reduced by $10,000 when computing the amount of liabilities under
section 357(c). By way of example, if assets with an adjusted basis of
10 and subject to liabilities of 20, together with the transferor's note
for 10, are conveyed for corporate stock, only the difference in the li-
abilities exchanged is within section 357(c) since that is the net
amount of liabilities which the corporation assumes-10, not 20.
This is the result when exchanges of "like kind property" are
made under section 1031, when each property is subject to a mortgage.
Suppose A owns an apartment house which is worth 50, has an adjusted
basis to A of 10, and is subject to a mortgage of 20. B owns an apart-
ment house which is worth 40 and is subject to a mortgage of 10. A
and B swap apartment houses, each assuming the mortgage on the
apartment house received by him. Although the 20 mortgage assumed
by B is "boot" to A under section 1031(b), 10 5 the amount of the boot
is determined by offsetting the 10 assumed by A against the 20 assumed
by B.10 6 A's gain is computed as follows:
Amount Realized:
Net value of property received 30
Liability assumed by B 20
Total Amount Realized: 50
Less: Adjusted basis 10
Gain Realized: 40
The gain recognized under section 1031(b) is the net of 20 minus
10. The consideration received by A due to B's assuming the 20 mort-
gage is offset by consideration given by A in the form of A's assuming
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a mortgage of 10.107 The same result should obtain in Alderman, since
the effect of giving the $10,000 note is to receive the stock subject to
a liability of $10,000. The net effect is to treat the transferor's liability
for the $10,000 note as a continuation, pro tanto, of his liability for
the $20,000. To that extent, it has not been assumed, nor have the
assets been taken subject thereto. Therefore,' the Crane-Woodsam
Associates deferral is continued and the $10,000 is, in effect, removed
from the amount realized under section 357(c).
CONCLUSION
Section 357(c)(1)(A) was intended by Congress to reinstate the
rule of United States v. Hendler only in the limited situation in which
the transferor has shifted liabilities to the transferee while retaining
the as yet untaxed gains arising from those liabilities. Accounts pay-
able of a cash basis transferor are not liabilities which have given tax-
benefit to him; they are not the subject of past deductions for depre-
ciation as were the mortgage debts in Crane and Parker v. Delaney;
nor are they the product of past tax-free borrowing against the value
of the transferred asset as was the case in Woodsam Associates and
Easson. To apply section 357(c)(1)(A) to such accounts payable is to
manufacture gain out of whole cloth.
Furthermore, section 357(c)(1)(A) should not be allowed to
reach situations which Hendler itself, however broadly construed,
would not reach. If the transferor will eventually pay the liabilities, as
in Alderman, or if the transferee is highly insolvent and creditors con-
tinue to look to the transferor's personal liability, as in Rosen, then
section 357(c) should not be mechanically applied because of a tech-
nical assumption of the liabilities by the transferee. These appear
to be situations in which, to the extent of insolvency, the liabilities
remain solely those of the transferor. The gain which is realized in
these situations should receive continued deferral from tax until such
time as the transferee in fact pays the debt, or acquires assets sufficient
to pay the debt.
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